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SECTION 8(d) OF LMRA AS A BAN ON STRIKES BEFORE
CONTRACT TERMINATION*
SECTION 8(d) of the Labor-Management Relations Act limits a union's
right to strike when bargaining for contract modification.' Subsection 8(d) (1)
provides that the union must notify the employer of its proposed modifications
"sixty days prior to the expiration date" of the contract.2 Subsection 8(d) (4)
requires the union to continue the existing contract in effect, without striking
"for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration
date of such contract, whichever occurs later." 3 Union members who "strike
within the sixty-day period" lose their rights as employees under the LMRA.4
A strike failing to comply with Section 8 (d) constitutes an unfair labor practice,
which may be stopped by a cease and desist order.6 Conflict has developed
*Local No. 3, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 325
(8th Cir. 1954), denying enforceinent to Wilson & Co., 105 N.L.R.B. No. 128, 32 LAD. REL.
REF. MAN. 1371 (June 30, 1953), cert. denied, 75 Sup. Ct. 36 (1954) ; Lion Oil Co., 109
N.L.R.B. No. 106, 34 LAB. REL. REF. MAN. 1410 (August 5, 1954).
For discussions of these cases, see 54 CoL. L. REv. 1006 (1954) ; CCH LAD. LAW RaP.
1150,008, 50,020 (1954) ; 33 LAB. REL. REP. ANAL. 72 (1954) ; 34 id. 61 (1954).
1. "[T]he duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract
shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modi-
fication-
"(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termil-
nation or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event such
contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make
such termination or modification;
"(4) continues in full force and effect, without resort to strike or lockout, all the terms
and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given
or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later." 61. STAT. 142 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. The union must also notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
thirty days after the § 8(d) (1) notice, of the existence of a dispute. Id. at 142, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (3) (1952).
4. 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952). The principal right lost is the
employee's right under § 10(c) to reinstatement at the end of the strike. Boeing Airplane
Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Local No. 3, United Packinghouse Workers
of America, CIO v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1954). Normally, employees striking for
contract modifications remain employees under the LMRA and are guaranteed reinstate-
ment at the end of a strike, subject to the employer's right to replace them during the
strike. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); Cusano v.
NLRB, 190 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 130 F.2d 919 (2d
Cir. 1942).
5. It is an unfair labor practice for a union to refuse to bargain collectively with an
employer. 61. STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1952). Included in the duty
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as to whether the "whichever is later" clause prevents a union from striking
during the term of a collective bargaining agreement.
The National Labor Relations Board in Wilson & Co.0 took the position
that bargaining strikes 7 before contract termination were valid under Section
8(d) if the union gave sixty days' notice. The Packinghouse Workers struck
twelve weeks after giving notice of intended contract modifications.8 Since the
strike occurred fourteen months before the collective bargaining agreement was
to terminate,9 Wilson claimed that the strike failed to comply %ith Section
8(d) (4) and was therefore an unfair labor practice.10 The NLRB, however,
held that the strike was valid since it took place more than sixty days after
notice.1'
In Local No. 3, United Packinghouse Workers of Amnrica, CIO v. NLRB,12
a companion case arising from the same nation-wide strike, the Eighth Circuit
interpreted Section 8(d) as outlawing all bargaining strikes occurring prior
to contract termination. After bargaining pursuant to an amending clause in
its contract,' 3 the Packinghouse lVorkers struck thirteen weeks after notice but
to bargain collectively is compliance with § 8(d). See note 1 sipra. Thus a strike in
violation of § 8(d) is an unfair labor practice. The NLRB, either on its own initiative or
upon petition by an employer, can order the strikers to cease and desist from continuing
the strike. 61 STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952); Report of Trial Ex-
aminer, Local No. 49, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO, 89 N.LR.B. 310,
338 (1950). The strike may also be enjoined pending the NLRB's determination. Curry
v. Union De Trabajadores De La Industria, 86 F. Supp. 707 (D.C.P.R. 1949). Cf. Mountain
States Div. No. 17 v. Mountain States T. & T. Co., 81 F. Supp. 397 (D. Colo. 1948) (em-
ployer can be enjoined from terminating agreement without giving notice required both by
contract and § 8(d) ).
6. Local No. 49, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO, and Wilson & Co.,
89 N.L.R.B. 310 (1950) (hereinafter referred to as Wilson).
7. The term "bargaining strike" will be used to denote strikes for the purpose of modify-
ing or terminating a collective bargaining contract.
8. Local No. 49, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO, 89 N.LR.B. 310,
311 (1950).
9. The contract was to terminate May 24, 1949. Notice was given December 26, 1947,
and the strike occurred March 16, 1948. Ibid.
10. Id. at 324.
11. Id. at 31& Two members of the Board concurred, stating that no notice period was
required for strikes during the term of a contract. They reasoned that, since § 8(d) (1)
referred only to notice at the termination of an agreement, it imposed no notice requirement
for bargaining strikes occurring prior to contract termination. Id. at 319 (Herzog), 323
(Murdock).
12. 210 F.2d 325 (Sth Cir. 1954), denying enforcement to Wilson & Co., 105 N.L.R.B.
No. 128, 32 LAE. REL. REF. MAN. 1371 (June 30, 1953), cert. denied, 75 Sup. Ct. 36 (1954).
13. "This agreement may be reopened by either party solely on the issue of general
wages... once during the period from August 11, 1947, to August 11, 1943, by written
notice.., thirty (30) days prior to the date on which it is desired to commence negotiations."
Master Agreement between Wilson & Co. and United Packinghouse Workers § 85 (1946).
The existence of the reopening clause in Packinghouse Vorkers was not mentioned by the
Eighth Circuit. See Local No. 3, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO v. NLRB,
210 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1954).
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five months before the expiration date of the contract.14 Wilson refused to re-
instate certain strikers at the end of the three-month strike.16 The union
petitioned the NLRB, which ordered reinstatement, relying on its decision in
Wilson to validate the strike under Section 8(d).10 The Eighth Circuit rejected
the NLRB interpretation by a literal reading of Section 8(d) (4). The Court
construed 8(d) (4) as preventing a union from striking for sixty days after
notice or until the expiration of the contract, whichever came later.17 Although
the Packinghouse Workers waited for sixty days, they struck before the termi-
nation date of the agreement, thereby violating Section 8(d). s As a result,
the strikers lost their status as employees and the court denied them reinstate-
ment.19
In Lion Oil Co. 2 0 a newly constituted Board adopted a third position, stating
that Section 8(d) outlawed all bargaining strikes before contract termination
except those which occurred at the time of contract modification. The con-
tract in Lion Oil could be amended after a certain date upon sixty days' notice
by either party, with an additional sixty-day notice required to terminate the
agreement.21 The Oil Workers gave the prescribed notice to amend and waited
eight months before striking.22 Since the union gave no notice of termination,
the strike took place before the contract's termination date.2 3 The NLRB
adopted the interpretation given Section 8(d) in Packhighouse Workers,24 but
14. The agreement was terminable on August 11, 1948. The union gave notice of in-
tended contract modifications on December 19, 1947, and struck on March 16, 1948. Wilson
& Co., 105 N.L.R.B. No. 128, p. 4, 32 LAB. REL. RE,. MAN. 1371, 1372 (June 30, 1953).
15. Local No. 3, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO v. NLRB, 210 F.2d
325, 327 (8th Cir. 1954). One of the company's reasons for refusing reinstatement was
that these men had engaged in acts of violence during the strike. Id. at 327, 330. Individual
acts of violence, even during a valid strike, give the employer the right to discharge the
wrongdoers. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939); Rubin Bros.
Footwear Inc. v. NLRB, 203 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1953).
16. Wilson & Co., 105 N.L.R.B. No. 128, pp. 4, 5, 32 LAB. REL. REF. MAN. 1371, 1372
(June 30, 1953). For earlier NLRB decision in Wilson see text at notes 6-11 supra.
17. Local No. 3, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO v. NLRB, 210 F.2d
325, 331-2 (8th Cir. 1954). In another companion case, United Packing House Workers
of America v. Wilson & Co., 80 F. Supp. 563, 569 (N.D. Ill. 1948), a district court gave
§ 8(d) an interpretation similar to that of the Eighth Circuit. See note 33 infra.
18. Local No. 3, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO v. NLRB, 210 F.2d
325, 333 (8th Cir. 1954).
19. Ibid. The court held alternatively that the employees in question had engaged in
acts of violence and therefore were not entitled to reinstatement. Id. at 330-1. See note
15 supra.
20. 109 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 34 LAB. REL. REF. MAN. 1410 (August 5, 1954).
21. Id. at 2 and n.1, 34 LAB. REL REF. MAN. at 1410.
22. Notice of the union's proposed contract modification was given the company on
August 24, 1951. The strike occurred April 30, 1952. Id. at 2, 34 LAB. REi.. REF. MAN at
1410, 1411.
23. Proposed Findings of Fact, Lion Oil Co., pp. 6, 35, aff'd, 109 N.L.R.B. No. 106,
p. 1, 34 LAB. REL. REF. MAN. 1410 (August 5, 1954).




defined the term "expiration date" in 8(d) (4) as including "modification
date."25 Since the Oil Workers gave sixty days' notice and struck at a time
when the terms of their contract were subject to modification, the NLRB held
that the strike complied with Section 8(d) even though it took place before
the contract terminated.26
Packinghouse Workers relied on the "plain wording" of Section 8(d) (4) to
outlaw bargaining strikes prior to contract termination.2-7 However, other pro-
visions of Section 8(d) raise serious doubt as to the meaning of the section.
Section 8(d) deprives only those who strike within the sixty-day notice period
of their employee status, without assigning any penalty to those who strike
after notice but before contract termination. 28 It seems anomalous that Con-
gress would penalize only strikers during the notice period if strikes both
before notice and before contract termination violate Section 8(d). 2 Further-
more, 8(d) provides that neither unions nor employers have a duty to bargain
over modification of contract issues if the modification is to take effect "before
such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the con-
tract" 0 If Packinghouse Workers is followed, Section 8(d) inconsistently
implies an affirmative duty to bargain at the time of contract amending .' and
25. Id. at 6, 34 LAE. RE1. REF. MAN. at 1412.
26. Id. at 9, 34 LAB. REL. REF. MAN. at 1413. One member, concurring, reaffirmed
Wilson, see text at note 11 supra, and stated that all bargaining strikes during the term of
contracts were valid if sixty days' notice was given. Id. at 16, 34 Lan. Rra- RFx. M'A:.
at 1415 (Peterson).
Another member affirmed his position in Wilson, stating that no notice was required
for pre-termination bargaining strikes, notice being required only when an agreement vwas
to be modified or terminated on its expiration date. See note 11 supra. However, he found
that the union's notice of modification had placed the parties under a new contract termi-
nable at will. Because the union failed to give notice of termination when it struck under
the new contract, and because its prior notice of modification was ineffectual, he held the
union in violation of § 8(d) and its members not entitled to reinstatement. Id. at 29, 30, 34
LAB. Ru. REF. MANi. at 1419, 1420 (Murdock).
27. Local No. 3, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO v. NLRB, 210 F2d
325, 332 (8th Cir. 1954). Lion Oil concurred in the proposition that the language of § 8(d)
was plain and unambiguous. Lion Oil Co., 109 N.L.R.B. No. 106, p. 4, 34 LAB. RU. RE,.
MAN. 1410,1411 (August 5, 1954).
28. See text at note 4 supra.
29. See Local No. 49, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO, 89 N.LR.B.
310-14 (1950). However, even without this statutory penalty, The Eighth Circuit held
that the union members had struck in violation of § 8(d) and were therefore validly denied
reinstatement. See notes 4 and 15 su pra. When employees engage in an illegal strike, they
are not entitled to reinstatement even though there is no specific statutory provision deny-
ing them reinstatement. See Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 740 (1951);
Auto Stove Works, 81 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1949) (individual misconduct). Also see Hoover
Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951) (illegal boycott).
30. 61. STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1952).
31. Employers and unions have a duty to bargain over provisions included within the
amending clause. See Cathey Lumber Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 157, 168 (1949) ; NLRB v. Sands
Manufacturing Co., 306 U.S. 332,342 (1939).
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yet forbids the right to strike, so essential to enforce such bargaining." Al-
though 8(d) (4) itself may be plainly worded, its logical incompatibility with
other provisions of 8(d) renders the entire section ambiguous.
Both Packinghouse Workers and Lion Oil cited quotations from the legis-
lative history of the LMRA to sustain their position that Section 8(d) pro-
hibited bargaining strikes prior to contract expiration. 3 However, inspection
of the Act's voluminous record fails to yield any support for the proposition
that a pre-termination strike preceded by sixty days' notice violates Section
8(d) . 34 Congress failed to consider such strikes when it drafted the section.05
32. Union spokesmen claim that few employers will come to terms if not faced with a
strike threat. Hearings before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 55 and .J.
Res. 22, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1188 (1947) ; Hearings before Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare on Revrions ins LMRA, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1953). Legislators and states-
men agree that the union's right to strike is essential. See statement by Senator Taft in
HARTLEY, OUR NEv NATIONAL LABOR POLICY, p. xiv (1945). See also GAGLIARDO, INTRtO-
DUCTION TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 259 (1953) ; Isaacson, Enforcement of Labor Agree-
ments by Economic Action, 6 NYU CONFERENCE ON LABOR 69, 71 (1952).
33. The Eighth Circuit's use of quotations from legislative history is misleading. The
court cited the Senate Minority report on the LMRA, which stated that § 8(d) incorporated
no-strike clauses in collective bargaining agreements "by legislative fiat." Local No. 3,
United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 325, 332 (8th Cir.
1954). But this section of the report referred only to the statutory prohibition of strikes
during the sixty-day notice period, and nowhere implied that a union would be prevented
from striking after a sixty-day wait. SEN. MiN. REP. No. 105, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
21 (1947), 1 NLRB, LEG. HIST. LMRA 483 (1948).
The court quoted Senator Taft as follows: "If such notice is given, the bill provides for
no waiting period except during the life of the contract itself." Local No. 3, United Pack-
inghouse Workers of America, CIO v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 325, 332 (8th Cir. 1954). But Taft
modified this later in the same statement by declaring that if notice was given less than
sixty days before contract termination the waiting period would extend beyond the life of
the contract. Nowhere in his statement did he consider strikes before termination of the
contract. 93 Cong. Rec. 3955 (April 23, 1947), 2 NLRB LEG. HisT. LMRA 1015 (1948).
The Eighth Circuit cited a district court case arising from the same Packinghouse
Workers' strike, in which the union attempted to enjoin Wilson from refusing reinstate-
ment following a strike after notice. The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
It did declare in dictum, unsupported by precedent or legislative history, that the Packing-
house Workers did not deserve relief since they had violated § 8(d) by striking before con-
tract termination. United Packinghouse Workers v. Wilson & Co., 80 F. Supp. 563, 569
(N.D. Ill. 1948). But a later district court case held a bargaining strike valid even though
it came before contract termination. See Textile Workers v. Atlantic Cotton Mills, 30 LA,.
RxI. REIF. MAN. 2400 (M.D. Ga. July 1, 1952).
Lion Oil's relevant citations from legislative history were the same as those in Pack-
inghouse Workers. See Lion Oil Co., 109 N.L.R.B. No. 106, p. 5 and n.5, 34 LAD. Ra.
REF. MAN. 1410, 1412 (August 5,1954).
The references to legislative history in Wilson attempted to show that § 8(d) permitted
pre-termination strikes on sixty days' notice, 89 N.L.R.B. 310, 315, 316 (1950), but they
are inconclusive, since none of these statements referred to pre-termination strikes. Congress
never considered the application of § 8(d) to such strikes. See text at notes 34-5 infra.
34. See the more than 8000 pages of hearings, reports, and debates in Hcarinqs before
Committee on Labor & Public Welfare on S. 55 and S.J. Res. 22, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947) ; Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor on H.R. 8, 80th Cong., 1st
[Vol. 64
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Congressional desire to achieve industrial stability was clearly expressed
throughout the hearings on the LMRA. But Congress' attention in this re-
gard was directed at strikes in breach of contract; it made unions involved in
these strikes subject to damage suits under Section 301. 31 However, Congress
specifically refused to declare that strikes in breach of contract were unfair
labor practices.3 7 It is unlikely that Congress by Section 8(d) intended to
invalidate pre-termination bargaining strikes permitted under a contract when
it refused to invalidate strikes in breach of contract.
In view of the ambiguity of Section 8(d)'s language and the failure of Con-
gress to consider whether bargaining strikes before contract termination vio-
lated the section, the general purpose of Congress in passing Section 8(d)
should govern its application to such strikes.38 The hearings and debates in-
dicate that the prohibition of strikes during the notice period wvas designed
primarily to prevent the damaging effect of strikes without warning and to
allow a cooling-off period during which differences might be discussed and
Sess. (1947) ; H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); SEN. Fln'. No. 105, 80th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1947); H.R. CONF. Run. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947); NLRB,
LEG. HisT. LMRA (1948) (congressional debates). For an examination of legislative his-
tory of § 8(d), see CCH LAB. LAw REP. U 50,008 (1954).
35. See authorities cited note 34 supra.
36. Section 301 of the LMRA allows suits to be brought in district courts against labor
unions for damages caused by the breach of collective bargaining agreements. 61 STAT. 156
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1952). It was to this section of the Act that legislators and
committees directed their comments on industrial stability, and it was from these discussions
and not from discussions on § 8(d) that the Eighth Circuit and NLRB obtained the state-
ment that "[i]f unions can break agreements with relative impunity, then such agreements
do not tend to stabilize industrial relations." SEN. REP. No. 105, '0th Cong., Ist Sess. 16
(1947), 1 NLRB LEG. HIsT. LMRA 422 (1948). See Local No. 3, United Packinghouse
Workers of America, CIO, 210 F.2d 325, 332 (Sth Cir. 1954) ; Lion Oil Co., 109 N.L.R.B.
No. 106, p. 4 and n.13, 34 LaB. REr. REF. MAN. 1410, 1411 (August 5, 1954).
The Eighth Circuit and NLRB confused strikes in breach of contract, covered by § 301,
with those in violation of § 8(d). They are similar in that both sections cover pre-termi-
nation strikes. But a strike in violation of a no-strike clause in a contract can comply with
§ 8(d), International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 181 v. Dahlem Construction
Co., 193 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1951), and a strike violating § 8(d) does not necessarily breach
the terms of a contract, see Local No. 3, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO
v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1954) ; and see text at note 19 mrpra. Cf. Reed v. Fovick
Airflex Co., 86 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (violation of § 8(d) no ground for § 301
suit).
37. The Conference Committee discarded a provision in -LR. 3020, 1 LEG. His?. LMRA
241-2 (1948), which would have made such a strike an unfair labor practice. The Commit-
tee stated: "Once parties have made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of
that contract should be left to the usual processes of law and not to the National Labor
Relations Board." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1947).
38. Section 8(d)'s logical inconsistencies are resolved if it is applied only to strikes
at the time of contract termination. Under this application, the waiting period in § 8(d) (1)
would begin no earlier than the sixty days immediately before contract termination. And
since the only strikes invalid under § 8(d) (4) would occur during this sixty-day period,
all guilty strikers would be denied reinstatement by statute. See text at notes 4 and 29 mipra.
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resolved.3 Since a waiting period of sixty days at the termination of a contract
was deemed sufficient for warning and cooling-off, there appears no sound rea-
son to forbid a strike for months or years merely because a contract has not
terminated.40 This is particularly true when the agreement specifically provides
for modification coupled with the right to strike.41 Since Section 8(d) was a
39. See 93 Cong. Rec. 3955 (April 23, 1947), 2 NLRB, LEG. HST. LMRA 1015 (1948)
(Taft: warning and mediation); 93 Cong. Rec. 5136 (May 12, 1947), 2 NLRB, LEG. HIST,
LMRA 1479 (1948) (Hatch: cooling-off) ; 93 Cong. Rec. 5146 (May 12, 1947), 2 NLRB,
LEG. HIsT. LMRA 1496 (1948) (Ball: warning); 93 Cong. Rec. 6542 (June 4, 1947), 1
NLRB, LEG. HIST. LMRA 887 (1948) (Madden: cooling-off); 93 Cong. Rec. 6662 (June
6, 1947), 2 NLRB, LEG. HIsT. LMRA 1580 (1948) (Murray: cooling-off). See also
HARTLEY, OUR NEW NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 121-2 (1948) (warning); International
Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 181 v. Dahlem Construction Co., 193 F.2d 470,
473 (6th Cir. 1951) (mediation) ; Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 988, 990 (D.C.
Cir. 1949) (cooling-off).
For references in hearings to the fact that the waiting period was designed for warning,
mediation, and cooling-off, see Hearings before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on
S.55 and SJ. Res. 22, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 273-75, 1146-50, 1389-90, 1544, 2010 (1947) ;
Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor on H.R. 8, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 219,
236, 2282, 2955, 3184 (1947).
40. During the congressional debates on the LMRA, there was no indication that § 8(d)
would impose more than a sixty-day ban on strikes. See 93 Cong. Rec. 3955 (April 23,
1947), 2 NLRB, LEG. HIsT. LMRA 1015 (1948) (Taft); 93 Cong. Rec. 4156 (April 25,
1947), 2 NLRB, LEG. HIsT. LMRA 1048 (1948) (Murray); 93 Cong. Rec. 5081 (May 9,
1947), 2 NLRB, LEG. HisT. LMRA 1408 (1948) (Ives); 93 Cong. Rec. 5137 (May 12,
1947), 2 NLRB, LEG. HiST. LMRA 1479 (1948) (Hatch). See especially the comments
of Senator Ball after the President's veto: "I think ours is a very mild provision, which
merely says to unions, 'You must have a 60-day reopening clause in your contract.'" 93
CoNG. REc. 7530 (1947).
At the hearing, no witness advocated more than sixty days notice before a strike, and
no one was under the impression that a bargaining strike at any time would be prohibited
for a period longer than sixty days. See, e.g., Hearings before Committee on Education
and Labor on H.R. 8, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 87, 131, 1071, 2264, 3099, 3845 (1947) ; Hear-
iugs before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 55 and S.J. Res. 22, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1544,1622-4,2010, 2393 (1947).
41. None of the strikes in the three instant cases were in express breach of contract,
since none of the contracts contained a no-strike clause. Local 49, United Packinghouse
Workers, 89 N.L.R.B. 310, 311 (1950); Wilson & Co., 105 N.L.R.B. No. 128, p. 4, 32
LAB. REL. REF. MAN. 1371, 1372 (June 30, 1953); Lion Oil Co., 109 N.L.R.B. No. 106,
p. 19 (August 5, 1954). The NLRB position appears to be that the right to strike is
not waived except when explicitly provided for in the contract. Dorsey Trailers, Inc.,
80 N.L.R.B. 478 (1948), enforcemenwt denied in part, 179 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Illinois
Bell Telephone Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1171, 11.74 and n.11 (1950) ; Local 49, United Packing-
house Workers of America, CIO, 89 N.L.R.B. 310 (1950). See Isaacson, Enforcet ft
of Labor Agreements by Economic Action, 6 NYU CONFERENCE ON LABOR 75-7 (1953).
However, some courts have stated that the contract itself, absent provisions to the con-
trary, creates the implication that the right to strike to change its terms has been waived
while the contract is in force. See NLRB v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 179 F.2d 589 (5th Cir.
1950) (inclusion of grievance procedure in contract creates implication of waiver of right
to strike over grievances until exhaustion of procedure). See NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co.,
[Vol. 64
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provision for warning and cooling-off, Congress probably intended it not to
prohibit strikes during the terms of contracts but to prohibit strikes for sixty
days after notice in all types of strike situations. 42 Thus the only purpose of the
"whichever is later" provision presumably was to prohibit a union from strik-
ing during the sixty-day notice period if this notice period extended beyond the
306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939). See also Isaacson, supra at 69, 74. The fact that the no-strike
clause is expressly bargained for in most contracts, see note 46 infra and 54 COL L. Rrv.
1006 (1954), would seem to indicate that most employers and unions believe that it has
some effect in limiting the union's right to strike.
Moreover, the strikes in Packinghouse Workers and Lion Oil were pursuant to amend-
ing clauses in the contracts. See text at notes 13 and 22 supra. Even if the waiver of the
right to strike theory is accepted, there is no reason to believe that this implication extends
to periods when the parties provide for contract modification. In Packingholose Workers,
the employer, prior to the controversy, explicitly recognized the union's right to strike at
reopening. See General Counsel's Exhibit 14, quoted in Brief for the NLRB, p. 4, Local
No. 3, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.
1954).
Finally, even if the strikes in the instant cases were in breach of contract, this does not
mean they violated § 8 (d). See note 36 supra.
42. When the ambiguity in § 8(d)'s language with respect to strikes before contract
termination was brought to the attention of Congress after passage of the LMRA, attempts
were made to amend § 8(d) to indicate clearly Congress' intent to allow strikes after sLxty
days notice in all situations. See Report of Joint Committee on Labor Management Rela-
tions, Sex. REP. No. 986, pt. 3, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-3 (1948) ; SE.N. RE:P. No. 374, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 45-6 (1949) (minority report). Senator Taft was in favor of amending the
section: "[]]t is not clear that a strike after 60 days' notice under an annual reopening
clause of a contract running for more than 1 year would not constitute a violation ....
The amendment proposed below makes it clear that such a strike would not constitute an
unfair labor practice." SEN . REP. No. 99, pt. 2, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1949). His amend-
ment included provision for notice of a reopening strike in § 8(d) (1) and struck out the
"whichever is later" clause in § 8(d) (4). Id. at 42. S. 249 as amended by Taft passed the
Senate, 95 CONG. Rac. 8717 (1949), but never became law. S. 2650, the latest attempt at
amendment, has been returned to committee. 100 Cong. Rec. 5859 (May 7, 1954). It
amended § 8(d) but did not change the content of §§ 8(d) (1) through 8(d) (4). For text
of the amendment, see 100 Cong. Rec. 75 (Jan. 11, 1954).
Besides the above interpretation that Congress intended § 8(d) to prohibit strikes for
a maximum of sixty days in all situations, two other interpretations of § 8(d)'s legislative
history are possible. The first is that taken by Murdock in Wilson and Lion Oil, see notes
11 and 26 supra, that Congress intended the section to apply only to strikes at contract
termination, and imposed no notice requirement on pre-termination bargaining strikes. How-
ever, if Congress' general purpose in passing § 8(d) is conceded to be warning and cooling-
off, see text at note 39 supra, it seems unreasonable to argue that Congress intended to
provide warning only for strikes at contract termination.
The second possible interpretation is that Congress made § 8(d) applicable only to
strikes at contract termination because it assumed that § 8(d) would prevent pre-termi-
nation bargaining strikes. This yields the same result as Packinghouse Workers. How-
ever, this interpretation seems unsound, since nowhere in the hearings, reports, and de-
bates on the LMRA was it stated or implied that § 8(d) would prevent strikes for a period
longer than sixty days. See note 40 supra. The only sanction Congress imposed on pre-
termination bargaining strikes was the damage suit if the strike breached the contract. See
text at notes 34-7 supra, and 52-3 infra.
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expiration date of the contract.43 Commentators have uniformly recognized no
purpose or effect for Section 8(d) other than warning or cooling-off. 44
The Eighth Circuit's approach in Packinghouse Workers threatens unfortu-
nate results. Most collective bargaining contracts have provisions which permit
amendment or reopening.45 Although a substantial majority of these also con-
tain some form of no-strike clause, almost all of them either expressly or im-
pliedly allow the union to strike at the time of amending.40 Packinghouse
Workers, by barring such strikes, destroys the effectiveness of these amending
provisions.47 Unions may thus find themselves bound to unsatisfactory terms
for much longer periods than they originally contemplated. Moreover, unions
bargaining for new contracts will find long-term agreements much less satis-
factory without adequate amending clauses. Rather than lose the right to strike
during the course of a long agreement, many unions may bargain for short-
term contracts or contracts of indefinite length, terminable upon sixty days
notice. These shorter and less secure agreements will frustrate rather than
encourage the aims of uninterrupted operation and industrial stability to which
the Eighth Circuit gave its approval. 48
43. See statement of Senator Taft in 93 Cong. Rec. 3955 (April 23, 1947), 2 NLRB,
LEG. HisT. LMRA 1015 (1948) ; Local No. 49, United Packinghouse Workers of America,
CIO, 89 N.L.R.B. 310, 316-7 (1950).
44. See BNA, THE NEw LABOR LAW 47 (1947); CCH, NEw LABOR LAW ff 45 (1947);
GAGLIARDO, INTRODUCTION To COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 177 (1953); WERNE, THE LAW 0F
LABOR RELATIONS 132, 235 (1951) ; 2 TELLER, LABOR DispuTEs AND COLLrCTivE BARGAIN-
ING § 398.79, p. 108 (Supp. 1950). See also 93 CoNG. REc. A2915-16 (1947) (Friendly);
93 CONG. REc. A2977 (1947) (Stark) ; Hearings before Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare on Revisions of LMRA, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 263, 270 (NAM), 465 (CIO) (1953).
45. An amending clause permits a union to negotiate with management to modify any
or all terms of the contract prior to termination. Approximately 80% of all collective bar-
gaining agreements have some type of amending clause. P-H UNION CONT. SERV. f 53,630
(1953). The reopening clause is a common type of amending clause, which is contained
in approximately 50% of all agreements, see LABOR-MANAGEMENT CONTRACT PtOVISIONS
28 (U.S. Bur. Lab. Stat. Bull. No. 1022, 1951) (2,754 agreements analyzed) ; P-H UNION
CONT. SERv. 53,420 (1953), and limits the area of bargaining to wages and closely related
fringe items. See P-H UNION CONT. Smwv. 53,457 (1953). Amending clauses usually
stipulate a specific date when bargaining may commence upon the election of either party,
if notice is given. Some clauses, however, stipulate that a contract can be reopened or
amended at any time, or after a specified date, or between specified dates, if notice is given.
BNA CoLL. BARG. NEG. & CoNT. Smv. 15:40 (1953); P-H UNION CoNT. SERv. ff 53,457
(1953). For specimen clauses, see BNA COLL. BARG. NEG. & CONT. SERv. 93:12 (1951).
46. Although 89% of contracts contain some form of no-strike clause, BNA CoLa.
BARG. NEG. & CONT. SERV. 15:325 (1954), 30% explicitly allow a union to strike during
amending negotiations, P-H UNION CONT. Smtv. %ff 53,390, 53,420, 53,396.1 (1953), and
most agreements impliedly permit such a strike. 34 LAB. REL. REP. ANAL. 64 (1954);
BNA COLL. BARG. NE. & CONT. SERV. 15:325 (1054).
47. See note 32 supra.
48. See Local No. 49, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO, 89 N.L.R.B.
310, 314 (1950). Long-term contracts encourage industrial stability. See General Motors
Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1140, 1142 (1953). Because a contract with a reopening clause can bar
a representation election for its entire term, shorter contracts make the union more vul-
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Lion Oil, although following the reasoning of Packinghouse forkcrs, reaches
a more justifiable conclusion by permitting unions to strike at the time of con-
tract termination or modification but at no other time during the life of the
contract. Since most contracts contain no-strike clauses preventing strikes
except during amending periods, 49 Lion Oil allows strikes during the only
periods when they would normally take place.50 Furthermore, for contracts with
year-long amending clauses similar to the one in Packinghous ITVorkers, Lion
Oil allows strikes at any time upon sixty days' notice.r'
However, Lion Oil is faulty in several respects. Because it states that bar-
gaining strikes prior to contract termination violate Section 8(d), it deprives
unions with agreements which lack an amending clause of their right to strike
during the life of these contracts. Moreover, although most agreements contain
no-strike clauses, unions may strike in violation of these contracts if they are
willing to risk suits for damages.52 Lion Oil follows Packinghouse Vorkers in
flatly prohibiting these strikes by declaring them unfair labor practices.0 Final-
ly, Lion Oil holds that Section 8(d) (1) is satisfied by notice eight months in
advance of a strike.5 4 This tends to shroud the exact time of the impending
nerable to decertification as bargaining representative. Bath Iron Works Corp., 101
N.L.R.B. 849 (1952); Western Electric Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 54 (1951).
49. See note 46 supra.
50. Unions would normally be dissuaded from striking for bargaining purposes at other
times because such a strike would breach a no-strike clause. See text at note 46 mipra.
Breach of contract would open the union to a § 301 suit for damages, see note 36 stpra,
and since the NLRB maintains the policy that strikers participating in contract breaches
are unprotected under the LMRA, employees would lose their right to reinstatement.
NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953); Joseph Dyson & Sons, Inc.,
72 N.L.R.B. 445 (1947) ; Scullin Steel Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1946). Cf. NLRB v. .Mastro
Plastics Corp., 214 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1954) (no loss of reinstatement where strike was in
response to employer's unfair labor practice). See generally ABA Committee on Improve-
ment of Union-Employer Contracts, The No-Strike Clause, 21 Gmo. NVAs. L. REv. 127
(1952); Levinson, Breach of Contract Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 2 LArn LJ. 279
(1951) ; Note, 63 YALE L.J. 1186 (1954).
51. Seenote 13mipra, But see note 52infra.
52. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 ct scq. (1952),
prevents the enjoining of strikes as a remedy for breach of contract. Alsoa S.S. Co. v.
McMahon, 173 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1949) ; In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 192 F2d 971
(2d Cir. 1951).
Moreover, unions are seldom sued for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, and
even these infrequent suits seldom result in damages being awarded. Sine. REP. No. 86,
pt. 3, pp. 30-2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) ; 49 MicH. L Rxv. 902 (1951); Isaacson, En-
forceient of Labor Agreements by Economic Action, 6 NYU CoNFEREcE O; LALo, 89
(1953).
However, if a strike violates § 8(d), it is an unfair labor practice. The LMRA specifi-
cally exempts injunctions for such strikes from the restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act 61 STAT. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(h) (1952).
53. See text at note 5 supra.
54. See text at notes 22 and 26 supra. The union in Lion Oil, although it did not
supply a second statutory notice of its impending strike, unofficially warned the employer of
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strike in uncertainty, thus frustrating the aim of Section 8(d) to provide ade-
quate strike warning. Although it would be impractical to require the union
to strike precisely sixty days after notice,5  it seems unreasonable to allow
grossly premature notice to act as compliance with the warning requirements
of Section 8(d).
Parties to collective bargaining agreements can avoid the impact of Pack-
inghouse Workers and Lion Oil when drafting new contracts. Unions desir-
ing to preserve their right to strike can bargain for short-term agreements or
contracts of indefinite length terminable upon sixty days notice.50 Or unions
and employers desiring both to retain the benefits of a long-term contract and
to allow the right to strike during the amending or reopening period may be
able to draft their collective bargaining agreements in the form of two contracts.
Contract I, for a long term, would include all provisions which the parties in-
tended to remain unchanged, such as pensions and union security. It would
also include a clause continuing the contract during any strike. Contract II
would cover only those basic provisions, such as wages, formerly subject to
modification, and would terminate on the former amending date. Upon the ex-
piration of Contract II, the union could strike to modify its terms after giving
sixty days' notice. Since such a strike would not modify Contract 1, and since
it would take place after the termination of Contract II, it would fully satisfy
even the literal interpretation given Section 8(d) (4) in Packinghouse
Workers.
5 7
The Eighth Circuit, on review of Lion Oil,58 should overrule or modify its
holding in Packinghouse Workers, which misconstrues both the purpose and
language of Section 8(d).59 If Packinghouse Workers stands, Congress should
the strike 11 weeks before it occurred. Lion Oil Co., 109 N.L.R.B. No. 106, p. 2, 34 LAn.
R.L. RaE. MAN. 1410, 1411 (August 5, 1954).
55. The strikes in Wilson and Packingho se Workers occurred 12 and 13 weeks, re-
spectively, after notice. See text at notes 9 and 14 supra. This notice would seem to be
sufficiently close to the time of the strike to provide adequate warning to the employer.
56. For typical clauses, see P-H UNION CONT. SERV. 1111 53,630-1 (1953) ; BNA COLL.
BARG. NEG. & CONT. SERV. 15:75, 36:11, 36:12 (1952).
57. The Studebaker Corp. and the United Auto Workers, CIO, have two agreements,
similar to Contracts I and II. See BNA COLL. BARG. NEG. & CONT. Smiv. 36:12 (1952).
Another contractual arrangement to achieve the same result would be a long-term con-
tract with a reopening clause listing provisions and dates for negotiations, with a stipulation
that the entire contract would terminate if no agreement was reached on the reopened pro-
visions. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from John L. Cockrill, Counsel for
Wilson & Co., dated June 10, 1954, in Yale Law Library. For specimen clause, see P-H
UNION CONT. SERv. 53,457.25 (1953).
58. Petition for review of Lion Oil was filed with the Eighth Circuit on August 23,
1954. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Jeff Davis, Counsel for Lion Oil
Co., dated September 29, 1954, in Yale Law Library.
59. A decision overruling Packinghoire Workers and allowing a pre-termination bar-
gaining strike upon 60 days' notice, with or without a reopening clause, would be preferred.
However, the court might accept Lio Oil, thereby allowing a pre-termination strike pur-
suant to an amending clause, and distinguish Packinghouse Workers on the ground that
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clarify Section 8(d) by explicitly allowing strikes during the term of collective
bargaining contracts upon sixty days' notice. G
it never considered the validity of a pre-termination bargaining strike pursuant to an amend-
ing clause. See note 13 supra.
60. Congress should amend § 8(d) (4) by deleting the words".., or until the expiration
date of such contract, whichever occurs later." Section 8(d) (1) should also be amended
to provide that notice must be given sixty days prior to the time when the union desires to
strike, rather than sixty days prior to the expiration of the contract. If Congress desires
to prohibit certain strikes during the term of an agreement, such as strikes which fail to
comply with amending clauses, it should do so by specific statutory enactment.
For suggested amendments to § 8(d), see SEN. REP. No. 99, pt. 2, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
42 (1949) ; SEN. REP. No. 986, pt. 3, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-3 (1948).
